Suzanne Roderick v. Nathan Ricks, Ray Zoll; Douglas T. Castleton; Abaco Publishing, Abaco Installers, and John Does I-X : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
Suzanne Roderick v. Nathan Ricks, Ray Zoll;
Douglas T. Castleton; Abaco Publishing, Abaco
Installers, and John Does I-X : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Steven C. Tycksen; Cory D. Memmott; Zoll & Tycksen; Attorneys for Appellee.
John T. Anderson; Anderson & Karrenberg; Attorney for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Roderick v. Ricks, No. 20000452.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/478
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SUZANNE RODERICK, 
Plaintiff, 
NATHAN RICKS; B. RAY ZOLL; 
DOUGLAS T. CASTLETON; ABACO 
PUBLISHING, a Utah limited liability 
company; ABACO INSTALLERS, a Utah 
limited liability company; and JOHN DOES 
IX, 
Defendants. 
DOUGLAS T. CASTLETON. 
Defendant, Crossclaim Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
B. RAY ZOLL. 
Defendant, Crossclaim Defendant 
and Appellee. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal No. 20000452-SC 
(Priority No. 15) 
F I L E D 
APR ) 7
 m 
CtEBK SOPBEME COURT 
" i n n 
Appeal From a Final Judgment 
of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah 
The Honorable Frank G. Noel 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
John T. Anderson (#0094) 
50 West Broadway, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Appellant Douglas T. Castleton 
ZOLL & TYCKSEN 
Steven C. Tycksen 
5300 South 360 West, Suite 360 
Murray, Utah 84123 
Telephone: (801) 685-7800 
Attorneys for Appellee B. Ray Zoll 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SUZANNE RODERICK, 
Plaintiff, 
NATHAN RICKS; B. RAY ZOLL; 
DOUGLAS T. CASTLETON; ABACO 
PUBLISHING, a Utah limited liability 
company; ABACO INSTALLERS, a Utah 
limited liability company; and JOHN DOES 
I-X, 
Defendants. 
DOUGLAS T. CASTLETON. 
Defendant, Crossclaim Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
B. RAY ZOLL. 
Defendant, Crossclaim Defendant 
and Appellee. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal No. 20000452-SC 
(Priority No. 15) 
Appeal From a Final Judgment 
of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah 
The Honorable Frank G. Noel 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
John T. Anderson (#0094) 
50 West Broadway, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Appellant Douglas T. Castleton 
ZOLL & TYCKSEN 
Steven C. Tycksen 
5300 South 360 West, Suite 360 
Murray, Utah 84123 
Telephone: (801) 685-7800 
Attorneys for Appellee B. Ray Zoll 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
ARGUMENT 1 
A. CASTLETON HAS SUFFICIENTLY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE 
TO ESTABLISH THAT THE FACTUAL FINDINGS HE IS 
CHALLENGING ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 1 
B. CASTLETON PROVED ALL OF THE ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO 
ESTABLISH A BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIM AGAINST 
ZOLL UNDER UTAH LAW 8 
1. As the Subservient Party in the Fiduciary Relationship With Zoll, 
Castleton is Entitled to the Protections Afforded by the 
Kilpatrick, Wheeler, Von Hake and Baker Cases 8 
2. The Trial Court's Determination That Zoll Was Not Castleton's 
Lawyer in April 1996 Cannot Stand 11 
C. ZOLL BREACHED HIS FIDUCIARY DUTY TO CASTLETON 
WHEN HE TOOK A POSITION ADVERSE TO CASTLETON AFTER 
RECEIVING CASTLETON'S CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 13 
D. ZOLL WAS THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL CAUSE OF 
CASTLETON'S DAMAGES 15 
E. CASTLETON SUFFERED SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGES AS A 
DIRECT RESULT OF ZOLL'S MISCONDUCT 17 
CONCLUSION 18 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES 
Baker v. Pattee. 684 P.2d 632 (Utah 1984) 10, 17 
Barrv v. Ashley Anderson. P.C.. 718 F. Supp. 1492 (D. Colo. 1989) 11 
Bradbury v. Rasmussen. 401 P.2d 710 (Utah 1965) 10 
Cunningham v. Cunningham. 690 P.2d 549 (Utah 1984) 10 
D.D.Z. Molerwav Freightlines. Inc.. 880P.2dl (Utah 1994) 9 
Ganser v. Corder. 980 P.2d 1032 (Kan. App. 1999) 11 
Houghton v. Dept. of Health. 962 P.2d 58 (Utah 1998) 14 
Kilpatrick v. Wilev. Rein & Fielding. 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah App. 1996) 9, 13, 14, 15 
Loporto v. Hoegemann. 982 P.2d 586 (Utah App. 1999) 2, 12 
Lundberg v. Backman. 358 P.2d 987 (Utah 1961) 2, 12 
Margulies bv Margulies v. Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985) 14 
Smoot v. Lund. 369 P.2d 933 (Utah 1962) 13 
Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp.. 873 P.2d 1141 (Utah App. 1994) 5 
Sperrv v. Smith. 694 P.2d 581 (Utah 1984) 2, 12 
Von Hake v. Thomas. 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985) 10, 17 
Wheeler bv and through Wheeler v. Mann. 763 P.2d 758 (Utah 1988) 9, 10, 17 
STATUTES 
Rule 4-506, Utah Code of Judicial Administration 2 
ii 
ARGUMENT 
A. CASTLETON HAS SUFFICIENTLY MARSHALED THE 
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE FACTUAL FINDINGS 
HE IS CHALLENGING ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
Zoll claims in his brief ("Oppos. Br.") that Castleton has failed to marshal the evidence 
necessary to challenge seven of the trial court's factual findings, has made assertions 
unsupported or contradicted by ilic avoid ;111« 1 has hulal to acknowledge facts supposedly 
relevant to the issue of whether Zoll breached his fiduciary duties to Castleton. (Oppos. Br. at 
19-26.) This claim, however, lacks merit As shown below, it is based on a 
mischaracterization of the arguments in Castleton's brief ;tnid 11 ;i misconception of the 
evidence in the record. 
1. Finding No. 11, 
Zoll suggests ilut C'iistleioii is precluded from characterizing ZoH's April 8, 1996 
conduct as an "ambush" because it is supposedly contradicted by Finding No 11 n finding 
that Castleton is not challenging. (Oppos. Br. at 20.) This suggestion is unconvincing. As a 
descriptive label, the term "ambush" has factual support in ntiniei OILS portions of the record. 
First, Finding No. 11 itself states that "Zoll did not advise Castleton that ihes \UT< 
going to confront him at the meeting with an allegation that he had stolen money from Ricks." 
(R. 1755.) It is a reasonable inference that ZoH's decision u> conceal the specific purpose of 
the meeting was to help retain the element of surprise during the ensuing interrogation that Zoll 
planned to> conduct (or Ricks In is hardly a stretch to characterize ZoH's purposeful set-up of 
the encounter as an "ambush." 
1 
Further support for the term "ambush" includes the facts that: 
— at the time of his encounter with Castleton, Zoll was Castleton's counsel of record in 
the divorce case (Finding No. 1, R. 1753; Trial Exhs. 1-14; Loporto v. Hoegemarm. 982 P.2d 
586, 589 (Utah App. 1999); Sperrv v. Smith. 694 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah 1984); Lundberg v. 
Backman. 358 P.2d 987, 989 (Utah 1961); Rule 4-506 of Utah C. of Jud. Admin.); 
— only two weeks before the encounter, ZoU's office had performed professional 
services for which it had just billed Castleton (Trial Exh. 27 at App. K);1 
— Zoll never urged or even suggested that Castleton engage his own independent legal 
counsel to accompany him to the meeting (Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 106, 107); 
— Zoll failed to recommend the retention of independent counsel even though he knew 
the meeting with Castleton would address a "very serious situation" which was "really 
sensitive [and] ugly" (Tr. at R. 1983, p. 125; Trial Exh. 24 at p. 1, App. C); 
— Zoll failed to abort the meeting when Castleton asked him to confirm that Zoll was 
also serving as Castleton's lawyer (Trial Exh. 24); 
— at the meeting, Zoll accused Castleton of having engaged in criminal conduct (Trial 
Exh. 24 at p. 3); 
1
 Zoll suggests in his brief that this bill was a "mistake." (Oppos. Br. at p. 9, n. 5.) His sole support 
for this suggestion is a citation to his pretrial deposition. However, that deposition is not a part of the record in 
this appeal and cannot be considered. And even if it is considered, there is absolutely no evidence that Zoll told 
Castleton the bill was a mistake before or at the time of the April 8, 1996 meeting. 
Moreover, ZoU's representation to this Court that "no legal services were performed by Zoll on 
Castleton's behalf on any case after February 14, 1995," see Oppos. Br. at 9, is contradicted by ZoU's own 
billing statement in September 1995 (Trial Exh. 20 at p. 28) in which he billed Castleton $22.50 to prepare the 
August 1995 demand letter. This billing statement twice characterizes the billed work as "professional services" 
performed for Castleton. IcL 
2 
— Castleton's predicament at the meeting was, according to Zoll, " . . . like having a 
kid with his hand in the cookie jar when |( 1asf ictonl rcali/ed we had the information [about the 
inflated invoices]." (Tr. at R. 1983, p. 115); and 
— Zoll "facilitated [the seizure of Castleton's property] by getting the parties together 
. . . "(Finding No. 15. 11. 1760). 
Thus, Zoll's own testimony, the transcript of the parties' tnediiijti. and the trial court's 
own findings fully justify the term "ambush" to describe the April 8, 1996 encounter. 
2. Finding No, 12. 
Zoll next suggests that "Castleton asserts in his bi ief that Zoll threatened Castleton at 
the April 8, 1996 meeting with arrest and criminal sanctions if Castleton did not cooperate in 
the civil action." (Oppos. Br. at ^ ) Castleton, however, has asserted no such thing in his 
brief. He accepts and does not challenge Finding No. \J ihui ""/ nil mhiscd Castleton at the 
meeting that his conduct was criminal in nature, but the Court finds that Mr. Zoll did not 
threaten to call the sheriff and liiiu; Mi Castleton arrested, as Castleton claims." (R. 1755.) 
Castleton's brief is faithful to this finding ('asiletom ne\ei argued in his brief that Zoll 
"threatened" him with "arrest and criminal sanctions." All he wrote was that "the transcript 
[of the April 8, 1996 meeting] also reflects that Zoll accused Castleton of engaging in criminal 
misconduct by presenting inflated invoices to Ricks" (Castleton. Hi ai HI), i'Liti /oil's 
misconduct included his ". . . accusation at the meeting that Castleton was guilty of criminal 
misconduct" (Castleton Hi ,i» I'M1 .mil thai /oil " accused Castleton of committing a 
criminal act, [Zoll] pressed Castleton to explain what he had done, [Zoll] extracted a 
3 
confession, and, as the trial court concluded, [Zoll] 'facilitated' the confiscation of almost 
every piece of property that Castleton owned" (Castleton Br. at 34). 
None of these statements express the concept that Zoll threatened Castleton with "arrest 
and criminal sanctions." By arguing otherwise, Zoll is misrepresenting Castleton's position. 
3. Finding No, 16, 
Zoll also argues that "Castleton asserts in his brief that Zoll pressured or exerted undue 
influence on Castleton to force him into signing an agreement that acknowledge^] that the 
taking of property by Ricks was 'consensual.'" (Oppos. Br. at 23.) Again, Castleton said no 
such thing in his brief. What he did say was that " . . . given the plainly coercive nature of the 
property transfer arrangement which Zoll 'facilitated,' and given his breach of fiduciary duty, 
any such consent was obviously voidable [as a matter of law]." (Castleton Br. at p. 11, n. 13.) 
Contrary to Zoll's suggestion, Castleton is not challenging the court's factual finding that the 
settlement agreement Zoll prepared was voluntarily signed. Rather, Castleton is only 
challenging the legal conclusions that Zoll did not breach his fiduciary duty and that Castleton 
is not entitled to void the tainted agreement Zoll prepared while still serving as Castleton's 
lawyer. 
4. Finding No, 25, 
Zoll claims that Castleton's statement that Zoll "simultaneously" represented Castleton 
and Ricks at the April 8, 1996 meeting is contradicted by Finding No. 25 in which the court 
determined that ". . . as of the April 1996 meeting, there was no attorney-client relationship 
between Zoll and Castleton." (Oppos. Br. at 21.) However, it is Castleton's position that, as 
a matter of law, Zoll represented both parties by virtue of his legal status as counsel of record 
4 
in Castleton1 s divorce case. (Castleton Br. at 17-24.) So long as Zoll continued as counsel of 
record in that ongoing case and tailed no withdraw, he legally remained Castleton's lawyer. 
Id, Indeed, Zoll's own Notice of Withdrawal dated November 22, 1996 (Trial Exh. 14, App. 
F) twice identifies Zoll as "Attorney for Plaintiff." 
5. Finding No. 26, 
The transcript of the parties' conversation at the Apr il * I *>% meeting--a transcript that 
the trial court expressly determined was accurate-reflects that Castleton immediately asked 
Zoll to confirm that he was also serving as Castleton's lawyer. (Trial Exh. 24 at p. 2, App. 
C.) This flatly contradicts Finding No. 26 in which the court ruled that " . . . neither Zoll nor 
Castleton subjectively believed at the time of the April 1996 meeting that there was an 
attorney-client relationship existing betwe* ^  i ihese two facts are internally 
inconsistent and are, on their face, fatally irreconcilable. Because Finding No. 26 is against 
the clear weigh! ol Hie evidence and is enough to enable this Court to reach a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made, it is clearly erroneous. Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah 
Copper Corp.. 873 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah App. 1994). 
6. Finding No, 27, 
In this finding, the court determined ili.il objectively speaking Castleton could not 
reasonably have [had] any expectation that an attorney-client relationship with Zoll [existed] at 
lhe lime ol tin: .- tpnl 19% meeting and after " ^ 1^<M \^ Castleton assiduously 
demonstrated in his opening brief, this finding is clear1* rr . - M h ,: ^ 12, 17-
24.) 
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The portions of the record that Zoll cites to support Finding No. 27, see Oppos. Br. at 
21, do not help him. For example, Zoll points first to the transcript of the parties' meeting. 
(Trial Exh. 24.) However, it plainly reflects that near the beginning of the meeting, Castleton 
asked Zoll to confirm that he was also serving as Castleton's lawyer.2 (Trial Exh. 24 at p. 2.) 
In the same fashion, the settlement agreement (Trial Exh. 25) can be of no assistance to Zoll 
on this issue because it was drafted the day after the April 8, 1996 encounter. Similarly, the 
notice of termination (Trial Exh. 26) has no relevance to this issue because it too was drafted 
and signed after the encounter. 
Finally, Zoll points to Castleton's affidavit (Trial Exh. G) which states in relevant part 
that Castleton "believed up until April 8, 1996 [Zoll] represented [Castleton]." (Trial Exh. G, 
t 12.) This is entirely consistent with Castleton's inquiry to Zoll at the April 8, 1996 meeting, 
"are you representing me too?" (Trial Exh. 24 at p. 2.) It is also consistent with the previous 
paragraph of the Castleton affidavit that Castleton's divorce was "still open," that Zoll "has 
never withdrawn from [Castleton's] divorce case," and that "no withdrawal has ever been 
communicated." (Trial Exh. 24, iff 21, 22.) 
2
 Zoll's explanation at trial of Castleton's request that Zoll confirm that he was serving as Castleton's 
lawyer was that "[h]e said those words and in my opinion in a very rhetorical way, suggesting are you going to 
jump in and help represent me in this matter." (Tr. at 1985 at 657:16-18.) Zoll further testified that Castleton 
"wanted me to try to continue to go forward in helping him in just doing the accounting to resolve the matter even 
though he knew I represented Mr. Ricks. I knew that his thinking was that 'I don't want to have to get a lawyer 
for myself.'" (Tr. at R. 1985 at 658:18-23.) Therefore, contrary to Zoll's argument that this testimony tends to 
support Finding No. 27, see Oppos. Br. at 21, the testimony actually supports Castleton's claim that until the 
denouement of the April 8, 1996 meeting Zoll was helping, and would hopefully continue to help, Castleton. 
6 
7. Finding No, 36, 
As Castleton demonstrated in his opening brief, Finding No. 36~that "there is no 
evidence whatsoever that ZoU had anything to do with the taking of additional property, the 
damage while in Ricks1 possession, or the circumstance of Ricks failing to return property that 
he had agreed to return"-is flatly contradicted by: 
(a) the trial court's own factual finding that "ZoU was aware that certain 
property was taken from Castleton's home and was going to be held by Ricks for security 
purposes [and] ZoU facilitated this arrangement by getting the parties together and drafting a 
notice of termination letter and an agreement between the parties";3 
(b) Zoll's own testimony that he thought it was a "good idea that Mr. Ricks take 
the property";4 
(c) Zoll's own written notice the day after the seizure that both he and Ricks had 
confiscated Castleton's property-not only the computer and related equipment discussed at the 
meeting, but "furnishings and the like from [Castleton's] apartment";5 and 
(d) Zoll's own testimony that he never provided Castleton with the accounting 
that was an essential precondition to any return of Castleton's property.6 
3
 Finding No. 35, R. 1760. 
4Tr. atR. 1983 at 129:1-5. 
5
 Trial Exh. 25, App. M. 
6Tr. atR. 1983 at 131:1-3. 
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As such, Zoll is incorrect in his statement that Castleton has failed to properly challenge 
Finding No. 36.7 
B. CASTLETON PROVED ALL OF THE ELEMENTS NECESSARY 
TO ESTABLISH A BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIM 
AGAINST ZOLL UNDER UTAH LAW, 
1. As the Subservient Party in the Fiduciary Relationship With 
Zoll, Castleton is Entitled to the Protections Afforded by the 
Kilpatrick, Wheeler, Von Hake and Baker Cases, 
Zoll argues that Castleton failed to prove any of the elements necessary lo prevail on 
his breach of fiduciary duty claim. (Oppos. Br. at 27-37.) In making this argument, however, 
Zoll overlooks the specific components of relief that Castleton requested and misconceives the 
potent protections that Utah fiduciary law affords a client who has been victimized by his 
lawyer. This leads Zoll to the indefensible conclusion that he is somehow legally privileged to 
take a position adverse to a current or former client if the client stops paying him, if the 
remaining legal work to be completed is limited to the arguing of a pending objection which 
only "center(s) on the insertion of four (4) phrases," if the client has allegedly misappropriated 
7
 Zoll's brief is replete with similar misstatements. For example, he states that Castleton argues in his 
brief that". . . he later made arrangements to pay his bill by giving printed materials to Mr. Rawle." (Oppos. Br. 
at 23.) However, Castleton's brief is devoid of any such statement. In addition, Zoll represents to the Court on 
at least six occasions in his brief that Castleton "stole $72,000" from Ricks. (Oppos. Br. at 3, 4, 12, 17, 37 and 
38.) There is no evidence to support this wild statement, and Zoll obviously offers none. 
An additional example of Zoll's failure to be faithful to the record in his statement that "Castleton 
failed to mention that the evidence also showed that Castleton and Roderick were engaged to be married and lived 
together during the pendency of the action while acting as plaintiff and defendant." (Oppos. Br. at 24.) Castleton 
indeed "mentioned" his marital status. See Castleton Br. at 4. What Castleton had no obligation to mention was 
the plainly irrelevant fact that he and his fiance sometimes resided together. 
Finally, Zoll states that Castleton sued him " . . . for $50 to $100 million in unsubstantiated damages." 
(Oppos. Br. at 18.) This is ludicrous. On its face, Castleton's cross-claim sought damages against Zoll only "in 
an amount to be established at trial." (R. 533.) 
8 
funds belonging to the lawyer's other (paying) client, or if the lawyer views his duty to file a 
written notice of withdrawal as sufficiently "perfunctory." (Oppos. Br. at 32-35.) 
Because Zollfs misconduct occurred while or shortly after he served as Castleton's 
lawyer, Utah law affords Castleton an array of important protections. Thus, Castleton's cross-
claim sought both an award of money damages against Zoll for his breach of fiduciary duty 
and rescission of the Zoll-prepared settlement agreement which, Zoll has repeatedly argued, 
reflects Castleton's voluntary, conclusive consent to the property seizure. (R. 531-32.) One 
aspect of Castleton's fiduciary duty claim was that Zoll's misconduct substantially assisted 
Zoll's other client in the unlawful confiscation of Castleton's property. (R. 1664; Tr. at R. 
1983 at 6:15-20; R. 1985 at 1682-83.) 
Each of these categories of relief-damages for Zoll's own misconduct, rescissionary 
relief against the transaction tainted by Zoll's breaches of fiduciary duty, and damages for 
Zoll's substantial assistance of his other client in the conversion of Castleton's property-is 
plainly available under Utah law. See Kilpatrick v. Wilev. Rein & Fielding. 909 P.2d 1283, 
1290 (Utah App. 1996) (recognizing claim for damages for lawyer's breach of fiduciary duty); 
Wheeler bv and through Wheeler v. Mann. 763 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1988) (recognizing claim 
for rescissionary relief to void transactions tainted by fiduciary agent's breach of duty); 
D.D.Z. v. Molerwav Freight Lines. Inc.. 880 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah 1994) (recognizing claim for 
damages against tortfeasor who provides "substantial assistance" to another party in 
accomplishing tort). 
Therefore, Castleton is not arguing that ". . .the Kilpatrick case is not the controlling 
authority in this case . . . ." (Oppos. Br. at 27.) Kilpatrick indeed sets forth the elements 
9 
necessary to establish a breach of fiduciary duty claim. What Zoll fails to understand is that 
the settled principles of Wheeler, Von Hake, and Baker-that it is the fiduciary who has the 
burden of proving absence of unfairness, and that it is the beneficiary who is entitled to void 
the tainted transaction and recover damages if this burden is not met~supplement, and do not 
supplant, the Kilpatrick elements of a breach of fiduciary duty claim.8 As this Court held in 
Cunningham. 690 P.2d at 553, this presumption is not overcome if the fiduciary agent proves 
that it acted even in "somewhat good faith." 
The trial court's failure to follow the Wheeler line of cases contributed to its defective 
legal conclusion that Zoll was guilty only of "very poor judgment." (Finding No. 32, R. 
1760.) At the very least, the court's failure improperly relieved Zoll of his heavy burden of 
overcoming the presumption of unfairness by showing that he disclosed all material facts 
relevant to the transaction and that " . . . the transaction was fair and reasonable in all 
respects." Wheeler. 763 P.2d at 760 (emphasis added). This fundamental misallocation of the 
parties' respective burdens of proof fatally tainted all of the trial court's findings and resulting 
conclusions. None of them can be sustained. 
It is not true, as Zoll claims, that these principles apply only if the fiduciary agent has engaged in self-
dealing. Although Wheeler involved self-dealing by a fiduciary, Von Hake and Baker did not. /aid neither of the 
two cases on which Von Hake relied to support the principle that a presumption of unfairness arises once a 
confidential relationship is proven-Cunningham v. Cunningham. 690 P.2d 549, 553 (Utah 1984), and Bradbury 
v. Rasmussen, 401 P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1965)~purported to limit the presumption solely to instances of self-
dealing. 
In any event, Zoll's misconduct in this case is the epitome of self-dealing. Zoll had previously 
represented Ricks in several matters and considered him to be a "good" client because, unlike Castleton, he 
always paid his bill. (Tr. at R. 1983 at 102:1-17.) Zoll, therefore, was anxious to aggressively service the legal 
needs of his paying client (Ricks) in taking a position adverse to his non-paying client (Castleton). By doing so, 
Zoll enriched himself at the expense of his client/beneficiary, Castleton. This is a classic example of self-dealing. 
10 
2. The Trial Court's Determination That Zoll Was Not 
Castleton's Lawyer in April 1996 Cannot Stand, 
Zoll's brief fails to address, let alone rebut, any of the controlling Utah cases and court 
rules that until the lawyer validly withdraws, he or she remains as counsel and owes an 
ongoing fiduciary duty to the client. (Compare Castleton Br. at 17-24 with Oppos. Br. at 29-
37.)9 Instead, Zoll attempts to rationalize his misconduct by suggesting that the requirement 
of filing a notice of withdrawal is merely a "perfunctory task" that supposedly "does not 
change the fact that Castleton was on notice that Zoll was no longer representing him as of 
August 2, 1995." (Oppos. Br. at 35.) Zoll's argument is unpersuasive for several reasons. 
Zoll's reliance on cases from other jurisdictions is misplaced. In Barry v. Ashley Anderson. P.C., 718 
F. Supp. 1492, 1494 (D. Colo. 1989), the reason the court decided that the attorney-client relationship ended 
before the lawyer formally withdrew was that the lawyer, unlike Zoll, knew that the client was adequately 
represented by replacement successor counsel. Barry. 718 F. Supp. at 1493. Because of this, the court properly 
held that "while the substitution of counsel in a pending case can be fully effectuated for all purposes by court 
order, where the old attorney's authority has been terminated and the new attorney's authority has been 
recognized by the parties involved, the necessity for formal substitution may be unnecessary." IdL at 1494. 
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Zoll never confirmed that his authority had been terminated. 
Indeed, his own paper trail-including his ill-fated August 1995 letter (which Zoll conceded was unclear), his 
September 1995 billing statement (which billed Castleton for legal work performed the previous month), his April 
1996 billing statement (which billed Castleton for one hour of professional services the previous month), and his 
November 1996 notice of withdrawal (which twice identified Zoll as Castleton's lawyer)~belies his claim that he 
no longer represented Castleton. Moreover, there is no evidence that Zoll's claimed de facto withdrawal was 
"recognized by the parties involved." Indeed, Castleton made a partial payment in response to Zoll's demand 
letter (Finding No. 6, R. 1754; Trial Exh. 22); Castleton readily accepted Zoll's invitation to go to his office to 
discuss a legal matter (Castleton Br. at 32, 33); Castleton asked Zoll at the meeting to confirm that Zoll was still 
his lawyer (Trial. Exh. 24 at p. 2); and, as late as November 1996, the lawyer for Castleton's former wife still 
believed that Zoll still represented Castleton (Tr. at R. 1983, p. 63). 
In the same fashion, Ganser v. Corder. 980 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Kan. App. 1999), is inapplicable. The 
basis for the court's decision that the parties' relationship ended before the lawyer obtained an order allowing him 
to withdraw from the case was the undisputed and abundantly documented fact that the client had fired the lawyer 
and " . . . from that point forward their relationship was adversarial." 980 P.2d at 1035. These facts are 
conspicuously missing from the case at bar. 
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First, there is nothing in the text of Rule 4-506 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration or any reported Utah case to suggest that the requirement of a filed notice of 
withdrawal is a merely ministerial or perfunctory function which can be blithely ignored. 
Indeed, settled Utah case law such as Loporto v. Hoegemann. 982 P.2d 586, 589 (Utah App. 
1999), Sperrv v. Smith, 694 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah 1984), and Lundberg v. Backman. 358 P.2d 
987, 989 (Utah 1961), stress the critically important legal effect of a filed notice of 
withdrawal. (See Castleton Br. at 18-21.) 
Second, Zoll's inartful August 1995 letter was anything but a present declaration that 
the attorney-client relationship was terminated. (Castleton Br. at 21-24.) Zoll used the future 
tense "will" to describe his intent to withdraw later if Castleton did not make arrangements to 
begin paying his bill.10 (Tr. Exh. 21, App. J.) Third, Zoll actually billed Castleton in 
September 1995 for the time spent drafting the August 1995 letter. (Trial Exh. 20 at p. 28.) 
Zoll's own bill twice characterized this work as "legal services." IdL Finally, Zoll billed 
Castleton for one hour of professional services performed by his law firm in March 1996. (Tr. 
Exh. 27, App. K.) These facts hardly support Zoll's suggestion that " . . . Castleton was on 
notice that Zoll was no longer representing him as of August 2, 1995." (Oppos. Br. at 35.) 
10
 Indeed, Zoll used the future tense "will" even though he believed he had already withdrawn and that 
Castleton understood this. (Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 76-79.) Because Castleton made a partial payment and Zoll never 
told him it was not enough to assure that Zoll would continue as Castleton's lawyer, Castleton fulfilled the 
condition of Zoll's letter that Castleton make arrangements to begin payment of his bill. Clearly, if Zoll believed 
that Castleton's partial payment was not enough to justify Zoll's continuing as Castleton's lawyer, it was Zoll who 
was obligated to notify Castleton of that fact; it was not Castleton who was obligated to read Zoll's mind. 
12 
Zoll's next effort to escape liability for his professional mistreatment of Castleton is the 
suggestion that the pending objection in the divorce case dealt with "only" four separate issues 
directed to the form of the order. (Oppos. Br. at 33.) Zoll, however, offers no authority for 
the proposition that the pendency of a written objection that a lawyer has prepared and filed 
can simply be ignored and that it does not preclude the lawyer from unilaterally withdrawing 
from the case. 
Finally, Zollfs assertion that by April 1996 the divorce case was " . . . essentially over 
and the objection was moot [because Castleton supposedly had withdrawn it]," Oppos. Br. at 
35, is not only ludicrous, it is unsupported by any citation to the record. Zoll offers no 
authority to support his transparently dubious theory that a lawyer's fiduciary duty to refrain 
from harming the client somehow vanishes if the lawyer can show (which Zoll cannot in this 
case) that the underlying case is "essentially over." Unimaginable mischief would arise if 
lawyers were allowed to switch client allegiances based on their own subjective beliefs that a 
case was "essentially over," especially where the objective evidence-such as the lawyer's 
demand letter, the lawyer's billing statements, the court's file, and the lawyer's written notice 
of withdrawal—all suggest otherwise. This Court should reject such an approach. 
C. ZOLL BREACHED HIS FIDUCIARY DUTY TO CASTLETON 
WHEN HE TOOK A POSITION ADVERSE TO CASTLETON 
AFTER RECEIVING CASTLETON'S CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMATION, 
A fundamental aspect of the lawyer's fiduciary duty of honesty and fair dealing is to 
refrain from " . . . representing] interests adverse to those of the client." Kilpatrick. 909 P.2d 
at 1290 (quoting Smoot v. Lund, 369 P.2d 933, 936 (Utah 1966)). This rule applies with 
equal force to prohibit lawyers from disclosing confidential information that was entrusted with 
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them by former clients. Margulies bv Margulies v. Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195, 1202-04 (Utah 
1985). Under applicable Utah law-including Margulies. Kilpatrick. and Houghton1 ^ -there is a 
presumption that if the past and present representations are "substantially factually related," the 
lawyer acquired and used confidential information against the former client. (See Castleton 
Br. at 25-29.) 
In this case, the trial court committed manifest legal error in concluding that there was 
no distinct factual connection between the three cases in which Zoll previously represented 
Castleton and the case in which Zoll represented Ricks against Castleton. (See Castleton Br. at 
26-29.) The prior and current representations shared a common factual link-the nature, extent 
and value of Castleton's assets, income and liabilities in a dispute with a third-party creditor 
seeking to collect a debt from Castleton. This made the representations "substantially factually 
related" and triggered the irrebutable presumption that Zoll used Castleton's confidential 
financial information against him. 
It was reversible error to place on Castleton the burden of proving how he was 
disadvantaged when Zoll took a position adverse to him. Utah law mandated that the onus be 
placed on Zoll. Because the trial court failed to apply this presumption, its resulting factual 
findings and legal conclusions—Finding Nos. 29-31 and Conclusion Nos. 5-8—cannot stand and 
should be vacated. 
11
 962 P.2d 58 (Utah 1998). 
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D. ZOLL WAS THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL CAUSE OF 
CASTLETON'S DAMAGES, 
Zoll accurately quotes Utah law that "to prevail on legal malpractice actions, clients 
must establish actual cause-that but for the attorney's wrong their loss would not have 
occurred-and proximate cause-that a reasonable likelihood exists that they would have 
ultimately benefited." Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1291. These elements were established here. 
1. Cause in Fact, 
The evidence that Zoll was the actual cause of Castleton's loss is overwhelming. It 
includes: 
1. It was Zoll who induced Castleton to come to Zoll's office (Finding No. 11, R. 
1755); 
2. It was Zoll who, before the ill-fated encounter, concealed the actual purpose of 
the meeting, idL; 
3. It was Zoll who failed to prepare or provide any oral or written disclosures of 
any potential conflict of interest in his simultaneous representation of Castleton and Ricks (Tr. 
atR. 1983, pp. 106, 107); 
4. It was Zoll who failed to have either client sign any waiver of conflict, id.; 
5. It was Zoll who failed to tell Castleton it would be prudent for him to retain 
independent legal counsel to accompany him to the meeting or to advise him about the 
implications of the conflict of interest, i(L; 
6. It was Zoll who accused Castleton of criminal misconduct (Trial Exh. 24 at p. 
2); and 
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7. It was Zoll who "facilitated" Ricks' seizure of Castleton's property by ". . . 
getting the parties together and drafting a notice of termination letter and an agreement 
between the parties" (Finding No. 35, R. 1760). 
But for Zoll's misconduct, there would have been no self-help seizure of Castleton's 
property. Zoll was, therefore, the cause in fact of Castleton's loss. 
2. Proximate Cause. 
In the same fashion, Zoll was the legal cause of Castleton's loss for at least two 
reasons. 
First, it is obvious that if Zoll had honored his fiduciary duty to Castleton, the late-
night, vigilante raid of Castleton's apartment and seizure of his property would never have 
occurred. Zoll's fulfillment of his duties of loyalty and fair dealing meant that the April 8, 
1996 meeting would have been aborted to allow Castleton to assess the implications of Zoll's 
sudden shift of professional allegiance from Castleton to Zoll's other client and Castleton's 
just-identified adversary, Ricks. Castleton then would have had the opportunity to engage 
independent counsel, free from Zoll's heavy-handed and grossly unfair inquisition and 
accusation of criminal misconduct. To say the least, Castleton would have "ultimately 
benefited" had Zoll faithfully discharged his fiduciary duty. 
Second, when and if this Court reverses the trial court's conclusion that Zoll did not 
breach his fiduciary duty, Castleton, as the aggrieved subservient party in the fiduciary 
relationship, is entitled (under the Wheeler line of cases, supra, at 8-10) to set aside the entire 
tainted transaction in which Zoll orchestrated the seizure of Castleton's property. Once the 
transaction is vacated, Castleton is entitled to either a restoration of the status quo as it existed 
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just before ZoU facilitated the seizure, or an award of damages for the full value of the 
property. This relief is not necessarily dependent upon an additional showing that ZoU's 
misconduct was the proximate cause of Castleton's loss. Under Utah law, once the breach of 
fiduciary duty is established, the aggrieved principal is entitled to relief. Wheeler. 763 P.2d at 
760 (Utah 1988); Van Hake. 705 P.2d at 769; Baker. 684 P.2d at 636. 
Therefore, the trial court's determination that ZoU's misconduct was neither the actual 
nor legal cause of Castleton's losses was based on a clear misreading of Utah fiduciary duty 
case law. The trial court's findings and conclusions on these issues must be reversed. 
E. CASTLETON SUFFERED SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGES AS A 
DIRECT RESULT OF ZOLL'S MISCONDUCT, 
While the trial court determined that Castleton failed to prove that ZoU breached any 
duty to Castleton or that ZoU was the factual or legal cause of Castleton's injuries, the court 
did not determine that Castleton failed to prove the existence or amount of damages. Rather, it 
only found that Castleton " . . . produced no evidence to establish a nexus between ZoU's 
conduct and his claimed damages." (Finding No. 39, R. 1761.) On that basis, the court 
concluded that "Castleton has failed to establish any damages directly attributable to ZoU's 
action." (Conclusion No. 13, R. 1763.) 
Because the court's findings and conclusions rejected Castleton's damage claim only in 
terms of causation, and not in terms of fact or amount, there is no merit to ZoU's suggestion 
that " . . . there is no definitive proof that Ricks took equipment that belonged to Castleton as 
opposed to property belonging to Roderick." (Oppos. Br. at 43.) Indeed, Castleton adduced 
extensive, largely unrebutted documentary evidence to establish the nature, extent and value of 
the property which ZoU helped plunder. (Trial Exhs. 28-36.) In the face of this evidence and 
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the clear absence of any finding or conclusion that Castleton failed to prove the fact or amount 
of damages, Zoll's argument to the contrary is bogus. 
CONCLUSION 
For at least the reasons advanced in both this and Castleton's opening brief, the Court 
should either (a) rule, as a matter of law, that ZoU breached his fiduciary duty to Castleton and 
remand for a determination of Castleton's damages, or (b) grant a new trial with instructions to 
apply the legal principles so plainly missing from the first trial. 
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